WAGE INEQUALITY ACROSS THE ROAD TRANSPORT SECTOR WITHIN THE EU by POLIAK, Miloš et al.
TRANSPORT PROBLEMS                                                                                2019 Volume 14 Issue 2 
PROBLEMY TRANSPORTU                                                                 DOI: 10.20858/tp.2019.14.2.13 
 
 
Keywords: wage; driver; road transport; European Union 
 
Miloš POLIAK*, Patrícia ŠIMURKOVÁ 
University of Zilina, Faculty of Operation and Economics of Transport and Communications 
Univerzitna 1, 01026 Zilina, Slovak Republic 
Kelvin CHEU 
University of Texas at El Paso, Collage of Engineering, Department of Civil Engineering 
500 W University Ave, El Paso, TX 79968-0516, USA 
*Corresponding author. E-mail: milos.poliak@fpedas.uniza.sk 
 
 
 
WAGE INEQUALITY ACROSS THE ROAD TRANSPORT SECTOR WITHIN 
THE EU 
 
Summary. The question of how to regulate the salaries of drivers working in the 
international road transport sector to balance the promotion of free movement of persons 
and the integration of the market with adequate protection of workers’ rights is rather 
complex. The range of problems of those seeking to ensure fair competition and fair 
treatment of employees arises from the fact that drivers operate across Europe but come 
from different countries where wage standards are significantly different, along with the 
working conditions. The paper addresses the issue of insufficient harmonization of social 
conditions in relation to the remuneration of drivers involved in road transport. The 
purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there are differences in driver 
remuneration across the EU, even though they carry out the same transport within one 
EU territory as part of international road haulage.  It also aims to identify whether there is 
a change in the terms and conditions of wage compensation over time. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Carriers in Western Europe in 2004 pointed out the risk of harmonizing the road freight market 
without harmonizing social and tax conditions. The emergence of the opportunity to employ a driver 
from Central and Eastern Europe has caused a distortion of the competitive environment in the road 
freight sector. The significance of the distortion of the competitive environment has gained 
significance at a time when manufacturing companies started using the just-in-time method, 
significantly reducing their inventory and storage costs [1, 4]. This, of course, has increased the use of 
freight transport between companies, and the number of supplies between companies has increased. 
The use of lorries has begun to increase, and haulers have begun to place greater emphasis on the 
quality of service, speed and reliability. New market conditions have led to an increased share of night 
work in the driver’s weekly working hours, which has also changed the driver’s willingness to perform 
the profession of driver under specific wage conditions [2]. Changing conditions in the road freight 
transport market has resulted in increased demand for road freight drivers. Several companies from 
Western Europe are getting drivers from the Central and Eastern parts of the EU. Leaving drivers from 
the eastern and central parts of the EU is causing a problem in this part of the EU. The reasons for the 
departure of the drivers mainly lie in the differences in driver compensation in individual EU countries 
[3, 6]. The aim of this contribution is to investigate whether there are indeed differences in driver 
remuneration across the EU, even though they carry out the same transport within one EU territory as 
part of international road freight transport. 
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2. EMPLOYMENT OF DRIVERS FROM CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
 
Employment of drivers from Eastern and Central Europe caused the most illegal workers in the 
European Union to be surveyed in the construction and road transport sector in 2000. The wage of 
these employees is often lower than the average wage level in the country. The European 
Commission’s 2004 enlargement targets for the EU were the requirement for candidate countries to 
catch up with western European countries in terms of wages and social legislation, integration into the 
European Union and compliance with EU requirements and EU regulations [5, 8]. In the field of road 
transport, wage harmonization is specific, as carriers offer transport throughout the European Union 
market to which each haulier established in the European Union, with a community license, has equal 
access [9]. 
Working migration is one of the top topics in the EU Legislative Body regarding the proposed 
package of measures that clarifies the salaries and conditions of EU staff members posted to jobs 
outside their home country, known as the Posting of Workers Directive. Initially road drivers were 
excluded from this directive. However, in recent years, there has been an increase in the number of 
transport companies that have moved jobs from richer EU countries to Central and Eastern Europe, 
with the aim of bypassing wage demands in their countries. This has prompted national legislation and 
protectionist measures in countries such as France, Germany and Austria, and has witnessed an 
increase in court cases related to driver wages across the EU [7, 12]. Under SR conditions, wages are 
above the wage in the national economy. For this reason, the aim of this research is to conclude 
whether there is a persistent gap in driver wages in the EU. 
 
 
3. OWN RESEARCH OF THE COMPARISON OF AVERAGE WAGES OF DRIVERS IN 
THE EU 
 
To verify the assumption of the pay gap between drivers of road freight within the EU Member 
States, research has been carried out on the level of remuneration in two consecutive periods ‒ spring 
2017 and autumn 2018. The aim of the two surveys is that we want to identify not only the level of 
wages of drivers in individual countries EU but also to find a change that makes it possible to predict 
whether the remuneration of drivers employed in the SR is the average of drivers’ wages in the 
Western European Union, and that the number of drivers leaving for work abroad will be reduced. 
 
3.1. Research on the average wage of drivers in 2017 
 
In the first half of 2017, in relation to driver remuneration, a survey of drivers’ wages was 
conducted in selected transport companies based in 10 different EU countries. Based on the survey 
conducted, the data on average wages used for conformity testing are compared, which compares 
whether driver wages differ between selected countries and at what significance level. The 
questionnaire regarding the remuneration of the drivers was conducted in the form of an anonymous 
electronic survey for its relative ease of filling and the availability in terms of distance. The electronic 
questionnaire was completed by 309 respondents, whereas social data were also used to collect data. 
The survey was attended by drivers of different age categories; the median age of drivers was 33 
years, with most respondents being drivers who had at least 10 years of experience. As far as the 
category of vehicle on which the drivers (respondents) was concerned, the truck was predominant. 
Regarding the mode of transport in terms of territorial division, the bulk of respondents were engaged 
in international transport. 
The conformity test is applied to the comparability of wage drivers in the Slovak Republic with 
respect to several selected EU Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherland, the 
Czech Republic, Norway, Poland, Austria and Italy).  
In Slovakia, in the sample size range n = 116, we have found the following average wages of 
drivers in €:1380; 1500; 1050; 1170; 1250; 1350; 1400; 900; 550; 600; 1600; 2400; 1200; 1500; 1200; 
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1600; 1800; 850; 1700; 1800; 2000; 1200; 1200; 1700; 1200; 1550; 1300; 1650; 1500; 1400; 1500; 
1500; 800; 850; 900; 1200; 1200; 750; 1200;1600; 1100; 1000; 1350; 1400; 600; 1400; 550; 1500; 
1200; 600; 1200; 1600;1200; 1000; 700; 1000; 1600; 2000; 1500; 500; 1000; 1450; 1500; 600; 650; 
1400; 750; 450; 2500; 1200; 2000; 1400; 600; 800; 1400; 550; 2500; 1100; 650; 1100; 1300; 900; 
700; 800; 1300; 1500; 1000; 530; 2300; 1000; 1400; 1500; 2200; 1400; 750; 1600; 1200; 2100; 1100; 
1600; 1200; 1500; 1300; 1750; 2000; 540; 404; 1400; 900; 1810; 1500; 1200; 500; 1300; 1400; 1500. 
In selected EU countries, in the sample size range n = 60, we have found the following average 
wages of drivers in €: 500; 1750; 2450; 1500; 630; 2200; 2160; 1650; 1600; 900; 1500; 1750; 2500; 
2500; 2100; 2180; 3690; 2500; 1850; 2300; 2100; 4301; 1400; 1600; 1600; 1700; 1750; 600; 2200; 
1356; 573; 1600; 1146; 620; 1612; 1774; 2063; 1070; 1375; 554; 1135; 688; 1146; 1176; 722; 1031; 
1713; 1135; 879; 1146; 825; 840; 722; 928; 1031; 877; 2475; 722; 933; 1719. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The proportion of country representation in the survey 
 
In relation to the given test, it is necessary to establish a null and alternative hypothesis: 
• null hypothesis: Driver wages are not different in the SR and selected member countries at 
the level of significance α = 0.05. 
• alternative hypothesis: Driver wages differ in the level of significance α = 0.05 in the 
Slovak Republic and selected member countries. 
 
At the level of significance α = 0.05, we verify the assumption that the variability of average wage 
rates in Slovakia is the same as the variation of average wages of drivers in selected EU countries. We 
verify the hypothesis 𝐻":	𝜎&' = 𝜎''	 versus a bilateral alternative 𝐻&:	𝜎&' ≠ 𝜎'': 𝜎&' = variance of Slovak driver salaries, 𝜎''	 = variance of driver salaries in other countries. 
From the selection data, we calculate the selection characteristics: ?̅?& = 1258.5690  ?̃?&' = 211950.1649  𝑠&7 = 460.3805 	?̅?' = 1517.4500  ?̃?'' = 564202.3873  𝑠'7 = 751.1340 𝐹 = ;̃<=;̃== = '&&>?".&@A>?@A'"'.BCDB = 0.3757 .     (1) 
Then, the critical values of the F-division are determined with v1 = n1 – 1 = 115 a v2 = n2 – 1 = 59 
and degrees of freedom for α = 0.05: 𝐹E= = 	𝐹"."'? = 0.65, 𝐹&GE= = 	𝐹".>D? = 1.59.    (2) 
The test criterion value belongs to the critical area 𝑣I = J0, 𝐹E=K; therefore, at the significance level 
α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis 𝐻":	𝜎&' = 𝜎''s,  which means that the wage variation of drivers 
in Slovakia and the wages of drivers in selected member countries varies considerably at the 
significance level α = 0.05. In the case of different variance verification, the classical t-test cannot be 
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used, but the test for non-conformance variance, referred to as Welchow t-test, is used [10] [11]. The 
test will be performed using an analytical tool ‒ a two-choice t-test with different variances in Excel. 
 
  
 
Fig. 2. Graphic representation and comparison of the drivers’ remuneration survey in 2017 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Chart of Critical Values and F-Partition Test Criterion (2017)  
 
Given the two-way formulation of the alternative hypothesis, we are interested in the level of 
statistical significance achieved for the two-tailed P (2) test = 0.0167. Obviously, the achieved 
significance value is significantly less than the set level of 0.05, and it is therefore justified to reject 
the null hypothesis. 
For graphical representation, then in Excel using the TINV function, we find the quantities. In this 
case, the number of degrees of freedom 83 (calculation using the analytical tool ‒ Excel) and thus the 
quantities are determined by the values of -1.98 and 1.98. For the calculated value t = -2.44, t <-1.98 is 
valid. 
 
 
Fig. 4. T-test results (2017) 
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Fig. 5. Graph of Critical Values and Test Criterion t ‒ Distribution (2017)  
 
The test criterion value belongs to the test area 	𝑣I = J−∞,−𝑡&GE=K; therefore, at the significance 
level α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis H0: μ1 = μ2. Based on the conclusions of testing, it is 
possible to reject the null hypothesis that the wages of drivers in Slovakia and the wages of drivers in 
selected member countries are not different. The two-choice t-test proved that the wages of drivers in 
selected member countries in 2017 differed statistically significantly from driver wages in Slovakia, 
with an estimate of 95%. 
 
3.2. Research on the average wage of drivers in 2018 
 
The same questionnaire survey on driver remuneration in the second half of 2018 was conducted to 
compare drivers’ year-on-year change in wages (Hungary, Austria, Germany, Norway, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium). However, for the comparability of the survey results, only the 
countries that were represented in the 2017 survey were considered in the following calculations. 
In Slovakia, we found these drivers’ wages in €: 1400; 900; 1100; 1300; 700; 1550; 1600; 1200; 
1000; 1300; 1500; 1200; 1250; 950; 1000; 1250; 1600; 1450; 1800; 1800; 1550; 1400; 1600; 1450; 
1700; 1500; 1250; 1550; 2300; 1500; 1250; 1600; 1850; 1600; 1450; 1500; 1400; 2200; 1500; 1300; 
950; 1100; 1600; 1550; 1900; 2300; 1850; 1200; 1350; 1200; 1100; 1300; 955;1700; 1500; 1075; 
1600; 1300; 1500; 1550; 1400; 1300; 1800; 1050; 2200; 1800; 1500; 1200; 1300; 1600; 873; 1400; 
1500; 1900; 900; 1050; 1700 1600 850; 1350; 1400; 1900; 1650. 
In selected EU countries, in the sample of n = 46, we found the following average wages of drivers 
in €: 2150; 2500; 1950; 2400; 2100; 1800; 1561; 934; 1600; 1800; 1238; 1100; 2100; 1350; 2100; 
1900; 1200; 1400; 1950; 986; 3100; 2350; 1600; 1200; 1650; 2200; 2450; 1126; 873; 1500; 1000; 952; 
1700; 1550; 1124; 1358; 1700; 1650; 1285; 1354; 1500; 2000; 1200; 1300; 1792; 2200. 
At the significance level α = 0.05, we will verify the assumption that the average wages of drivers 
in Slovakia are the same as the average wages of drivers in selected EU countries. To determine the 
appropriate test method, it is also necessary to perform an F-test to verify whether the wage variance is 
the same for drivers in Slovakia and drivers in other Member States [10]. As in the first case, we first 
verify the hypothesis 𝐻":	𝜎&' = 𝜎''	versus the bilateral alternative 	𝐻&:	𝜎&' ≠ 𝜎''. From the selection 
data, we calculate the following sampling characteristics: ?̅?& = 1434.3735   ?̃?&' = 109400.1393  𝑠&7 = 330.7569 ?̅?' = 1648.5434  ?̃?'' = 248046.0758  𝑠'7 = 498.0422 
Since the test criterion value F = 0.4410 is less than the critical value of 0.6067, it belongs to the 
critical region	𝑣I = J0, 𝐹E=K For this reason, we reject the null hypothesis H0: σ12 = σ22 and we accept 
the alternative hypothesis H1: σ12 ≠ σ22, which means that the wage scattering of drivers in Slovakia 
and selected member states at the significance level α = 0.05 is not identical. In this case, it is not 
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possible to use the classical t-test, but we will use the test for non-conforming variations called 
Welchow t- test. The test will be carried out in the same way as in the previous survey by means of an 
analytical tool ‒ a two-choice t-test with different variances in Excel. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Graphic representation and comparison of the drivers’ remuneration survey in 2018 
 𝐹 = ;̃<=;̃== = &">A"".&B>B'AC"A@."D?C = 0.4410 .    (3) 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. F-test ‒ hypothesis testing for driver wages in 2018  
 
 
Fig. 8. T-test results (2018) 
 
The level of statistical significance achieved for the P (2) bilateral assay is 0.011 and is 
significantly less than the 0.05 level, which means that we reject the null hypothesis. For the number 
of degrees of freedom 67 (calculation using the analytical tool ‒ Excel), the quantities are determined 
by values -1.99 and 1.99. For the calculated value t = -2.61, t < -1.99. 
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Fig. 9. Graph of Critical Values and Test Criterion t ‒ Distribution (2018)  
 
The test criterion value belongs to the test ?̅?' = 1517.4500 area 	𝑣I = J−∞,−𝑡&GE=K; therefore, at 
the significance level α = 0.05, we reject the null hypothesis H0: μ1 = μ2. Based on the compliance test, 
we can say with confidence 95% that the average driver’s wage in the SR and other selected Member 
States also differs on the basis of the 2018 survey.  
 
3.3. Assessing the results of driver remuneration research within the EU 
 
Despite the claims of several transport companies that the difference between the wages of a driver 
working in Slovakia and a driver working mainly in Western Member States is minimal and there is 
no reason to leave drivers to work in other EU countries; in this case also, it is confirmed that driver 
wage levels are still lower compared to Western EU countries. Thus, we can say that one of the causes 
of the lack of drivers in Slovakia and therefore the departure of drivers to other countries is lower 
wages. Also from the survey, it was shown that the wages of Slovak drivers increased in 2018 
compared to the previous year, and the final salary level in some cases approached the driver’s wage 
in Western countries, but it should be noted that approximately half of the driver’s salary in Slovakia 
and therefore the basic component of gross salary is at an overall lower level compared to the Western 
EU states. This means that sickness, nursing care or the amount of the pension is calculated by the 
driver from the value of his gross wage, which in many cases is at the level of 600‒700 €/month. On 
the contrary, in the Western Member States, travel allowances represent around 10% ‒20% of the 
driver’s salary, which is a significantly higher assessment base for the reported contributions. 
Also, other motivating factors are the considerably higher family allowances for the child. For 
comparison, Figure 10 shows the representation of child allowances in selected EU Member States. It 
can be seen from the graph that the amount of child benefit varies considerably between EU countries. 
 
 
 
Fig. 10. Structure of driver remuneration for road freight transport in the EU (Source: CNR European Studies) 
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Fig. 11. The amount of child allowance in EU countries in 2018 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper contributes to fill the gap in the understanding of social road harmonization. Road 
transport is service specific because it provides transport throughout the EU, but it is subject to the 
national regulations of a company headquarters. A continuing problem is the harmonization of road 
transport business conditions in the EU common market. The contribution identifies differences in the 
social field of drivers and points out that Eastern and Central EU carriers operate with lower wage 
costs in the same transport market as other EU countries, resulting in an increase in the number of 
transport companies moving their branches from the richer EU countries to Central and Eastern 
Europe to circumvent their country’s wage demands. At the same time, surveys have pointed out that 
the wage of Western countries for the driver is still higher than in other EU countries, resulting in a 
lack of drivers working in countries with substantially lower wages. It has also been pointed out that 
not only the wage level itself can motivate drivers to work for transport companies based in Western 
EU countries, but also more attractive social benefits such as. child or child allowance the height of 
the measuring base. 
Harmonizing the wages of international road drivers is problematic. It is not possible to reduce 
wages for Western European countries because they are below average wages. On the contrary, it is 
not possible to raise wages for the countries of the eastern and central part of the EU, because they are 
now well above the average wage. About the harmonization of conditions, it should be noted that the 
EU institutions do not have their own means to enforce EU legislation. For example, there is no pan-
European labour inspectorate [13, 14]. The subsidiarity principle of work, with the privilege of 
enforcement, is a matter for the Member States, and therefore the EU depends on the willingness and 
agreement of national governments. 
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